Abstract Few theoretically-consistent empirical models addressing the relationship between 6 ambiguity, risk, and preferences for health and safety exist. To fill this gap, we propose a 7 theoretical non-expected-utility model (NEUM) that is relatively easy to estimate using an 8 interval-data model. The NEUM we develop hinges upon two sources of variability, one over 9 risk and the other over ambiguity about the risk.
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and that over the probability of the event) can at least theoretically be reduced to a single 101 stage so that predictions will be consistent with those from known-probability models. Other 102 models, such as the ones proposed by Quiggin (1982) and Segal (1987) , relax the reduction 103 assumption and allow for ambiguity by assigning weights to event probabilities. Kahn and 104 Sarin (1988) address ambiguity using an SOP model that adds a decision weight to the 105 value function. In some instances Choquet integration is required so that non-additivity of 106 probabilities can be accommodated (Schmeidler, 1989) .
107
Whatever the theoretical approach, nearly all existing empirical work addressing ambigu-108 ity aversion examines preferences for financial and investment decisions in an experimental 109 or laboratory setting (Ellsberg, 1961; Curly and Yates, 1985; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Chow 110 and Sarin, 2001; Mukerji and Tallon, 2001; Ho et al., 2002) We emphasize two points: first, 111 existing empirical results come from laboratory experiments, and second, nearly all empirical 112 results on ambiguity pertain to financial gambles, or choices involving simple probability 113 experiments such as balls drawn from urns.
114
Economists have only recently begun to develop empirical welfare models containing 115 ambiguity effects for uncertain health or environmental outcomes in a real-world setting 116 (Viscusi and Chesson, 1999) . A handful of surveys have been designed to allow ambiguity to 117 be explored outside the laboratory setting. Cameron (2005 Cameron ( , 2003 extends the empirical risk 118 literature and allows for ambiguity about mean, future global temperatures using a single 119 variable mean-variance approach.
6 She applies the model to a convenience sample of college 120 students and shows that ambiguity affects the willingness to pay (WTP) for climate-change 121 mitigation programs. use a survey-based study of nuclear waste disposal 122 to examine housing-location decisions when mortality and morbidity risks are uncertain. In 1987, the U.S. Congress named Yucca Mountain Nevada, 90 miles northwest of Las Vegas, 125 as the only candidate site for a central high-level nuclear waste repository. If completed, the 126 Yucca Mountain (YM) project is expected to cost over $55 billion, making it among the most 127 expensive U.S. government projects ever constructed (Slovic, 1993; Desvousges et al., 1993; 128 Flynn and Slovic, 1995; Flynn et al., 1997) . Over 77,000 tons of high-level radioactive waste 129 will be shipped by rail or highway from commercial and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) 130 sites across the U.S., in approximately 53,000 shipments, taking place over the course of 24 131 years.
132
At the projects' inception, the DOE funded several studies examining the public's reaction 133 to a central repository for the nation's high-level nuclear waste. In one such study, Kunreuther 134 and Easterling (1990) used survey-based methods to examine attitudes and values associated 135 with nuclear-waste transport. They found that just over 70 percent of a national sample 136 agreed with the statement "highway and rail accidents will occur in transporting nuclear 137 waste." When offered a payment of $5,000 to offset the risks of nuclear-waste transport, 32 138 percent of the respondents reported they would accept the compensation. It is important to 139 note that the study did not find significant risk-perception differences between the national 140 and Nevada samples. A flurry of papers following these studies focused on the importance 141 of the psychology and perceptions of risk in forming preferences for nuclear-waste transport 142 (Flynn and Slovic, 1995; Flynn et al., 1997; Slovic, 1993) . 
151
Using data from a different part of the same survey mentioned above on housing location 152 decisions , There are convincing arguments that ambiguity about risk exists (Camerer and Weber, 1992;  166 Manski, 2004; Starmer, 2000) . This may be particularly true for those risks, such as nuclear- 
Because V i is log-linear in income, it has the attractive property of diminishing marginal 208 utility of income that is consistent with financial risk aversion. The utility function allows 209 individuals to have a nonconstant marginal utility of income. Income effects may be appropri-210 ate when the good, here safety, accounts for a significant portion of a household's perceived 211 wealth. However, a linear-in-income utility function could also be used if income effects are 212 thought to be unimportant.
213
Although many authors have equated health-and financial-risk aversion, this is problem-214 atic because diminishing marginal utility of income implies little about an individual's taste 215 for changes in health and safety risks (see Eeckhoudt and Hammitt, 2004) . Thus, we add 216 a risk function f (π) to V 1 to account for changes in utility stemming from mortality-risk 217 aversion. Analogous to financial-risk aversion, f (π ) should accommodate either linear or 218 nonlinear relationships between mortality risk and utility. Health or mortality risk aversion 219 is evident if utility and increasing health risk are inversely related. We use the functional 220 form proposed by Cameron (2005) that assumes that risk and the squared deviation from risk 221 7 To date, the DOE EIS is the only publicly-released document that details the YMR, however, some environmental groups have distributed their own information in the form or posters and advertisements in magazines. The DOE document proposes 15 alternative Nevada transport routes but maintains that other routes not included in the EIS may be considered as alternatives. Container and truck designs are also presented as preliminary. The information available from the DOE lacks precision and that, coupled with sources of other, conflicting information, is likely a source of ambiguity on the part of respondents. 8 All notation below assumes that the model is for an individual or household, but we have omitted individualspecific subscripts to avoid clutter. 
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affect utility so that 9 :
The next step is to find the expected value of the utility difference based on the risk 223 function. We note that the unconditional expected value of the risk function can be found by 
thus the unconditional expected value is:
Using (3b), the unconditional expected utility difference can be found by applying the
. Taking the expectation of the utility dif-
230
ference conditional on σ 2 π over π yields:
where α = α 1 − α 0 and ε = ε 1 − ε 0 . The unconditional expectation is then:
Setting (5) equal to 0 and solving for A gives a generalized option price (GOP) defined
233
as the ex-ante payment that equates utility over the risky and nonrisky states. Assuming a 234 standard-normal observation error (ε) the formulas for the GOP and the median GOP, or
235
Med ε [GOP] 10 are:
As constructed, the GOP is an exponential function of income, individual-specific char-237 acteristics, the expected mortality risk, and random variation in that risk. Note that variables,
238
9 Admittedly, the quadratic functional relationship between utility and π is implied by a mean-variance model is somewhat arbitrary. However, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies of the brain suggest that the mean-variance approach is consistent with brain functions (See Preuschoff, Bossaerts, and Quartz, 2005) . 10 We use the median of the OP term because it offers more stable values than the average. See Kanninen and Hanemann (1999) . 
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
such as risk, that presumably decrease utility cause GOP to rise. Although the philosophy 239 of our approach mirrors other SOP models (see Kahn and Sarin, 1988 , for example), our 240 mechanics are novel. Our second-order random variable deviates from an approach based 241 on nonlinear probability weights by assuming that the moments of the risk distribution drive 242 preferences through the utility function. Changes in the mean risk affect utility and GOP. 243 And, for a given mean risk, changes in ambiguity shift expected utility and the corresponding 244 GOP.
245
Our empirical model, like that of Kahn and Sarin's (1988) , allows us to distinguish between 246 ambiguity preference and ambiguity aversion by testing the sign of γ 2 . A value of γ 2 > 0 247 implies a preference for ambiguity; i.e. increasing ambiguity causes expected utility to rise 248 and the GOP to fall. A value of γ 2 < 0 implies ambiguity aversion meaning that given a 249 choice, people prefer to bet on known rather than unknown probabilities. As a result, we can 250 derive a statistical test for the relationship between ambiguity, utility, and the GOP based 251 on a log-likelihood test of the model parameters. This is in contrast to a split-sample design 252 laboratory experiment where the statistical significance of ambiguity is tested by presenting 253 an ambiguous risk to one of two groups of subjects and looking differences in choice patterns 254 between the groups.
255
Another attractive feature of this model is that it allows for a nonlinear relationship between 256 risk and GOP. Risk affects the GOP through the exponential function in (6). This allows for the 257 s-shaped relationship, recognized by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) , between GOP and risk. 258 Experimental evidence suggests that individuals overvalue changes in low-level risks and 259 undervalue similar changes in high-level risks relative to the linear-in probabilities expected-260 utility model. 11 The GOP proposed in (6) accommodates nonlinear risk preferences and 261 allows us to develop a statistical test for that nonlinearity based on the signs of γ 1 and γ 2 .
262
Finally, note that the model allows GOP to explicitly account for heterogeneity in perceived 263 risk. Rather than having a Bayesian updating model, where individuals form priors and 264 the model assesses the degree to which information influences dependence on a posterior 265 distribution, our model makes the welfare measure a simple and direct function of perceived 266 risk. Thus, the model may be used to calculate how the GOP varies across households or for a 267 given household as their risk perception changes with changes in the household information 268 set.
269
In summary, we present a model based on a non-expected utility approach with a mean-270 variance component that leads to welfare measures for a change in risk. The resulting welfare 271 measure, the GOP function in (4), has four attractive properties: (1) it accounts for health-risk 272 aversion together with financial-risk aversion, (2) it allows for testable ambiguity effects, (3) 273 it allows for the nonlinear risk preferences that are often observed in the experimental risk 274 literature, and (4) it allows for heterogeneity in risk perception and preferences. household member had ample time to review the booklet before the telephone interview.
293
In the telephone interview, respondents were first queried about risk perceptions related 294 to nuclear-waste transport. Using the risk ladder, respondents reported either a point estimate
295
or a range of the mortality risk from transporting the nuclear waste along the proposed route.
296
The respondents could offer their own estimates, even if this was off the risk ladder's de-
297
picted scale. Although a few respondents (fewer than 5 percent) reported that their subjective 298 mortality risks were outside the ladder's range, the overwhelming majority of individuals 299 placed the risk somewhere along the ladder, though as will be seen, not necessarily at a point 300 corresponding to the DOE estimates.
301
Following the risk assessment, respondents were presented with a hypothetical risk- with nuclear-waste exposure risk.
312
The compensation amount was presented as a federal-tax rebate. This method of payment is 313 reasonable, as the federal nuclear-waste program required that the host state be compensated.
314
Under the 1987 amendments to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, Nevada was to be compensated 315 at $10 million per year during the site-characterization phase, and $20 million per year once 316 waste began to be delivered to the site. States can then use these federal dollars to compensate 317 or relocate households asked to bear additional risks (Flynn and Slovic, 1995) .
318
We asked respondents about relocation decisions to avoid protest responses encountered in 319 focus groups. In direct valuation questions, focus-group participants tended to reject compen-320 sation amounts that were sometimes 25% or more of their annual income. When confronted 321 about whether they would actually return a federal-tax rebate, some responded that they 322 would relocate thereby indirectly refusing compensation whereas others said that they would 323 12 Note that Environmental Protection Agency 's safety threshold relates exposure risk to an actual accident occurring rather than to an unconditional risk. 13 The phone-mail-phone method frequently used in CVM studies is applied here to obtain responses to a survey of a sample of Nevada residents. UNLV students were trained as telephone interviewers.
Springer
U N C O R R E C T E D P R O O F
not relocate or return a tax rebate. Thus, we interpreted the latter group's decision to refuse 324 compensation as a protest response. In a follow-up focus group, we found that respondents 325 where more comfortable answering the "stay" versus "relocate" question rather than being 326 offered a choice of accepting or rejecting compensation directly.
327
The overall response rate, calculated as the number who completed the entire survey 328 (both phone interviews) divided by the total number of people contacted, was 27.4%.
14 This 329 response rate is relatively high for the highly transient Nevada community, reflecting interest 330 in the topic. Nevada is notorious for telemarketing and junk mail and low survey response 331 rates are the norm. Many of those who were initially called hung up before being told the 332 purpose of the telephone call. Thus, the low response rate likely overstates those that actually 333 rejected the survey topic because it includes those that simply rejected any telephone contact 334 from an unfamiliar party.
335
Low response rates may cause bias if they are not representative of the target population. 336 To gauge the representative nature of the sample of respondents, we carefully compared the 337 demographic profile to that of the larger Clark County population using the 2000 Census 338 figures and found that the demographic statistics were comparable overall. Those responding 339 to our survey were slightly more affluent than the county population as a whole. Median 340 household income in Clark County is $44,616 compared to our sample-mean income of 341 $51,100. Household sizes in the sample were similar to that in Clark County; 2.74 persons 342 per household in the sample versus the Census estimate of 2.65 persons per household. And, 343 as in many surveys, the sample was modestly skewed toward older individuals: 21 percent 344 of Clark County households contain at least one retiree, and the sample contained 24 percent 345 with retirees. Other demographics features of the sample were quite similar to those reported 346 by the U.S. Census Bureau for Clark County.
347
Further reassurance concerning our sample comes from the striking similarity between 348 our risk estimates and those from an in-person interview survey conducted later for the DOE, 349 in March 2003 (see Riddel, Boyett, and Schwer, 2003) . In the 2003 in-person survey, the 350 same basic risk ladder was used as we used for this study with the addition of a blow-up of the 351 low-risk end of the ladder (that depicting causes of death less than 1 in 1,000 annual lifetime 352 deaths) following Carson and Mitchell (2000) . The mean perceived death rate was 425 in 353 100,000 in the 2003 survey compared to a death rate of 454 in 100,000 estimated from our 354 2001 survey. The fact that in-person interviews with the visual expansion of low-end risks 355 in the risk ladder produced roughly the same mean risk estimate as our earlier phone-mail-356 phone survey offers further support for the validity of the survey instrument and basic risk 357 ladder. 
Empirical development 359
The ultimate goal of this paper is to provide a model that will calculate a risk-related welfare 360 measure (our GOP) for nuclear-waste transport for a broad range of subjective-risk distri-361 butions. This section presents the model in two parts. First, we explore heterogeneity in the 362 moments of the subjective risk distribution. Following that, we present the choice model used 363 to estimate the GOP.
364
14 This percentage includes all of those contacted as a base, including those that hung up without being informed of the purpose of the telephone call. Many surveys report only refusals after the topic has been presented, thus the reader should take care when comparing this to other response rates; ours is the more conservative number. 4.1. Modeling risk and ambiguity
365
Our welfare measure in (6) requires individual-specific estimates for the mean and expected
366
variance of the subjective-risk distribution. The survey respondents either offered their current 367 perceived risk as one point on the ladder, or offered a range for the risk rather than one point.
368
The Risk as a probability or chance is inherently bounded on (0,1) so the beta distribution, also 378 bounded on (0,1), is a natural and reasonably tractable choice to describe the variation in π 379 (Heckman and Willis, 1977) . Thus, assume perceived risk for individual i, π i , follows the beta 
383
We estimate values for a and b i using an iterative approach. We estimate preliminary 
391
Given the estimates ofâ andb i , we compare the implied distribution to the empirical 392 distribution and choose the value ofâ that best improves the fit. Conditioning on that value,
393
we obtain a second preliminary estimate ofθ. This procedure is repeated until convergence 394 is achieved.
395
The converged value estimate forâ = 0.00091. As mentioned above, we allow 396 the expected risk to vary with a set of respondent-specific independent variables, 397 thusμ πi =â a+bi =â a+θ Z i . The marginal change in the mean risk for a change in Viscusi (1989) proposes using the individual's prior and updated assessments of risk in a Bayesian approach to risk assessment. However, only the current estimate is relevant to the expected-utility function. Thus, acknowledging that people will update not only the mean, but also the variance of their subjective risk and consequently their option price as future information becomes available, we use their current risk perception in the model. One of the strengths of this model is that it allows us to calculate E[OP]s for any risk level. Deaths/100,000 # Log-likelihood −11 −11 * , * * , and * * * represent significance at the 0.15, 0.1, and 0.05 levels, respectively. # This is the average death rate for certain and "ambiguous" respondents that is predicted by the model. an index of the total information, MORE INFORMATION, by scoring a one for each in-407 formation source and summing to get the total index value. A zero value indicates that the 408 respondent had not heard of the proposed facility whereas, subsequently higher values corre-409 spond to more information exposure. Another information variable, TOUR FACILITY, takes 410 on a value of one if the respondent had toured the facility and a zero otherwise, representing 411 a high degree of familiarity with the facility. tistically lower perceived risks.
435
The average perceived death rate is 214/100,000 and 216/100,000, for models I and II,
436
respectively. These estimated averages are thousands of times higher than the engineering-
437
based risk calculations reported by the DOE and depicted on the risk ladder. This enormous 438 discrepancy is consistent with much previous research that finds large differences between 439 expert and subjective risk assessments (Slovic, 1993) .
440
Conditioning on the stated risk, we next queried respondents about their willingness to 
Choice model and results

444
We now turn to operationalizing the NEUM developed above. If the individual accepts 
451
The choice model can be estimated using the interval-data probit model (see Appendix C
452
and Hanemann et al. (1991) for a thorough discussion).
453
People act based on their beliefs, and the subjective risk estimate is the key relevant
454
variable for the NUEM model (see Viscusi (1989) , for a discussion of subjective risks reside (OWN HOME), and a dummy variable representing retirement status (RETIRED).
466
18 Other models, not presented here, used the midpoint of the range for the estimated mean risk for uncertain respondents. The coefficient of the variable was very close in magnitude to those presented here, but their standard errors were significantly larger. Thus, we prefer the estimates arising from the beta distribution rather than those from the midpoint. # Mean risk estimates (μ π ) are the stated risk for "certain" respondents. For "uncertain" respondents, risk estimates are calculated using the beta distribution (Table  1 ) and the reported range is used as an estimate of mean ambiguity (μ σ 2 π ). * Calculated as the sample average of the predicted median GOPs.
Homeownership is included in the model to control for intangible moving costs such as time 467 and money spent selling the current home and purchasing a new home and/or employment 468 relocation costs. Table 2 reports the results of a double-bounded logit model. The double-bounded survey 470 question format was used to add precision to the estimates (Hanemann et al., 1991) . 19 For 471 both models, the estimate of the marginal utility of income,β, is positive and significant.
469
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472
Health and retirement status of respondents play significant roles in determining the vari-473 ation in responses to the WTA question. Healthier respondents are more likely to refuse 474 the compensation offered, indicating that healthy individuals place a higher value (GOP) on 475 potential mortality risks than those whose health is compromised. This is consistent with a 476 diminishing marginal value of health. Similarly, the positive and significant coefficient of 477 RETIRED indicates that retired individuals express a greater readiness to accept compen-478 sation and have a correspondingly lower GOP for the risk from nuclear transport. Studies 479 have shown that older people are less likely to relocate (Ermisch and Jenkins, 1999) , which 480 seems intuitive. Also note that the Bush administration suggested that the federal cost-benefit 481 studies allow the value of a statistical life (VSL) to vary with age so that older people have 482 a lower VSL. The findings here offer some support of that hypothesis, particularly for the 483 oldest age group.
21
484
The OWNHOME and CHILDREN variables are not significant in Model I. Having chil-485 dren present does not affect welfare estimates in our sample. The homeownership variable 486 19 We assume that the reader is familiar with the double-bounded procedure: Hanemann et al. (1991) is the standard reference on this approach. 20 β is the coefficient of the income term ln( Y +A Y ). 21 The value of a statistical life (VSL) is the mean WTP divided by the change from the baseline risk. An age variable was also included in the indirect utility-difference model but was not significant. Thus, the functional form implied by the model II in Table 2 suggests a threshold rather than a continuous relationship between WTA and age. (1993) and Slovic (1993) . Our results, therefore, could 529 potentially be used for estimating losses nationally for any group of households with homes 530 near designated transportation routes (see Kunreuther and Easterling, 1990 ). An important 531 caveat is that risk perception may vary significantly from region to region. In fact, a large body 532 of research supports the finding that people update their risk beliefs given new information 533 (Viscusi, 1989 
Conclusions 541
This paper presents a new formulation of a NEUM that addresses many of the problems 542 facing the EUM and is especially well-suited to empirical estimation of welfare estimates 543 of mortality or health risk and ambiguity changes. The model incorporates preferences for 544 mortality risk when respondents exhibit ambiguity about those risks, while accommodating 545 many of the preference relations established and desired by expected-utility theorists. We 546 know of very few empirical models that incorporate mortality risks, and none that incorporate 547 ambiguity. We present a statistical test for risk and ambiguity preferences and find that a func-548 tional form that allows for these components is warranted. The results buttress past findings 549 such as Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) that stress psychological factors, information, and 550 ambiguity as a source of variation in both risk perception and valuation.
551
We apply our model to estimating the welfare costs, in terms of a generalized option 552 price, of the risk from nuclear-waste transport. Our results reveal that the level of perceived 553 risk, the amount of ambiguity surrounding transportation-safety strategies, and individual-554 specific characteristics such as health and retirement status all play key roles in influencing 555 risk preferences. Social costs, as reflected in the GOP, increase as the risk to health and safety 556 from transport increases. The option price is increasing in respondent uncertainty, suggesting 557 that people feel that ambiguity about transport diminishes their utility thereby increasing their 558 GOP nuclear-waste transport.
559
If and when high-level transport occurs in Nevada, people along the route may become 560 accustomed to the transport and their perceived risk may fall, barring any accidents. Con-561 versely, accidents may draw attention to transport, causing perceived risk to rise even if the 562 consequences to human health and safety are minimal. Our empirical results will still be 563 applicable even if general perceptions of transport risk change because the empirical model 564 allows the social costs to change as perceived risk and ambiguity change.
565
Appendix A 566 We assume that risk is distributed as a beta probability function (Heckman and Willis, 567 1977) . In other words, π ∼ beta (a, b) , where beta represents the beta probability 568 
574
The probabilities of the possible responses are described as: 
